The Limits of Epistemology by Markus Gabriel

Author:Markus Gabriel
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9781509525706
Publisher: Wiley
Published: 2020-01-08T00:00:00+00:00

Notes

1. Michael Williams calls this exaggerated demand on knowledge the ‘Prior Grounding Requirement’, see e.g. Problems of Knowledge, pp. 24f.

2. This anti-sceptical strategy has been pursued in particular by Michael Williams and Crispin Wright. See Williams, Groundless Belief and Problems of Knowledge; Wright: ‘Wittgensteinian certainties’, ‘Hinge propositions and the serenity prayer’ and ‘Warrant for nothing’. Andrea Kern also argues against Cartesian scepticism by appealing to our necessary finitude, whose boundaries it seeks to overstep. See ‘Warum kommen unsere Gründe an ein Ende? Zum Begriff endlichen Wissens’.

3. Michael Williams therefore exploits Cartesian scepticism only in order to demarcate our epistemic capacities. He ultimately uses it to justify a version of fallibilism: ‘[A]ll the skeptic’s argument shows is that there are limits to our capacity to give reasons or cite evidence. This is a point about grounding. To get from what he argues to what he concludes, the skeptic must take it for granted that no belief is responsibly held unless it rests on adequate and citable evidence’ (Problems of Knowledge, p. 148).

4. Andrea Kern speaks in this connection of ‘positions of moderation’ by which she understands all positions that ‘regard the skeptical argument as valid but are nevertheless convinced they can make knowledge intelligible’ (Sources of Knowledge, pp. 62, 79ff.).

5. It should be noted at this point that we here face the potential problem of how necessarily finite beings can have a concept of their finitude. The question is thus whether a subject who asserts their necessary finitude must not eo ipso already be beyond that finitude. This was, of course, Hegel’s suspicion about Kant’s epistemology, which, as we have described it above, is indeed a negative dogmatism insofar as it seeks to draw the boundaries of human reason with the help of reason itself, and thereby relies on the self-cognition of finitude. See chapter 15 below.

6. For a more detailed discussion of the point, see Gabriel, ‘Endlichkeit und absolutes Ich’.

7. That the problem of self-application arises for Williams, too, can be seen in such general formulations as the following: ‘all justification takes place in an inferential and dialectical context’ (Problems of Knowledge, p. 179; my emphasis).

8. Sextus explicitly compares his method with the establishment of a semantic paradox such as ‘nothing is true’ (οὐδέν ἐστιν ἀληθές) or ‘I am saying nothing determinate’ (οὐδεν ὁρίζω) – i.e. with a position that, when applied to itself, leads to its own cancellation (OS, 1.14f.). This is precisely what distinguishes the sceptic from the (positive and negative) dogmatist. While the latter asserts that what she asserts is the case, the sceptic constructs a position that potentially (δυνάμει) cancels itself out. Expressions such as ‘nothing is true’ have the property that they say something true (i.e. of all other expressions) as long as they are not applied to themselves. This qualification is central, as Sextus would otherwise be unable to express anything at all. See OS, 1.15: εἰ ὁ δογματίζων τίθησιν ὡς ὑπάρχον τοῦτο ὃ δογματίζει, ὁ δὲ σκεπτικὸς τας φυνὰς αὐτοῦ προφέρεται ὡς δυνάμει

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